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Torts
by Cynthia Trimboli Adams*
and
Charles R. Adams HI*
"I asked for ice, but this is ridiculous."
These were purportedly among the last words of the tycoon John Jacob
Astor as, clad in formal evening attire, he tenderly placed his wife into
a lifeboat and, a gentleman to the last, prepared to meet his watery
grave aboard the Titanic after it struck an iceberg in the frosty North
Atlantic ocean on April 15, 1912.' For the writers of this survey, faced
with navigating through a record number of torts cases, this scene is rife
with analogies. Obviously, asking for a little and getting a lot is
appropriate. As usual, space requirements have forced us to make a
rigid triage of which cases shall survive to be surveyed and which shall
go down with the ship, so to speak. Guided by no such noble sentiments
as "women and children first," it was our mercenary intention to rescue
only the first-class passengers. Consequently, we present the surviving
cases as the "Astors" of the survey period-and hope we have not left our
readers at sea.

* Assistant Solicitor General, State Court of Houston County, Georgia. Oxford College
of Emory University (A.A. 1977); Emory University (B.A., M.A., 1979); Mercer University
(J.D., cum laude, 1983). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of Adams & Adams, Fort Valley and Macon, Georgia. Adjunct
Professor, Mercer University School of Law. University of Georgia; Mercer University (B.A.
1980; J.D., cum laude, 1983). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. These famous words, like so many of the legends that have come to surround the
Titanic disaster, are probably apocryphal. See DAVID SINCLAIR, DYNASTY: THE ASTORS AND

THEIR TIMES 207 (1984). For the "classic" Titanic story, see WALTER LORD, A NIGHT TO
REMEMBER (1955). To sort the legends from the truth (somewhat), see WYN CRAIG WADE,
THE TITANIC: END OF A DREAM (1979). For an update following the 1986 discovery of the
Titanic's remains, see CHARLES PELLEGRINO, HER NAME, TITANIC (1988).
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INTENTIONAL TORTS

In General

A.

It may seem a bit strange to begin a torts article with a contract case,

but in West American Insurance Co. v. Merritt,2 the court of appeals

gave an added dimension to Georgia's definition of an "intentional tort."3
The insureds in this case were sued after their son shot a friend of his
with a BB gun and put out his eye. The insured's son had intended only
to hit his friend in the buttocks with the BB in retaliation for a similar
act that the friend had perpetrated on him.4 The homeowner's carrier
sought to deny coverage on the grounds that the policy excluded
coverage for "bodily injury expected or intended by the insured."'
The court, recognizing the that the policy considerations were
somewhat different in this contract case than in a torts case,6 nevertheless proceeded to hold the exclusion inapplicable.' Because the insured's
son only intended for his friend to experience pain, not physical injury
or harm, the court applied the rule of the Restatement that the basic
test is the actor's state of mind about the consequences of his act.8
Under these circumstances, the court concluded, the insurance company
was not entitled to summary judgment.9
B.

Conversion

The court revisited the definition of the tort of conversion in Katz v.
° Conversion constitutes
Harris."

2. 216 Ga. App. 822, 456 S.E.2d 225 (1995).
3. See generally Fowler v. Southern Wire & Iron, Inc., 104 Ga. App. 401, 122 S.E.2d
157 (1961), rev'd on othergrounds, 217 Ga. 727, 124 S.E.2d 738 (1962).
4. 216 Ga. App. at 822, 456 S.E.2d at 226.
5. Id. at 823, 456 S.E.2d at 226.

6.
It is important to remember that the legal issues here rise from contract law....
Consequently, policy considerations differ from those in tort and criminal cases.
Public policy does not prevent a party from assuming by contract duties more
burdensome than those imposed by law because of a party's right to refuse the
contract.
Id. (quoting State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Morgan, 258 Ga. 276, 276, 368 S.E.2d 509, 510
(1988)).
7. Id. at 826, 456 S.E.2d at 226.
8. Id. at 823, 456 S.E.2d at 226; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
9. 216 Ga. App. at 824, 456 S.E.2d at 226-27.
10. 217 Ga. App. 287, 457 S.E.2d 239 (1995).
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(a]ny distinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted over another's
property in denial of his right, or inconsistent with it ....
It is
unnecessary to show that the defendant applied it to his own use, if he
exercised the dominion over it in defiance of the owner's right, or in a
manner inconsistent with it .... It is immaterial that such dominion
was exercised in good faith, for whoever meddles with another's
property ... does so at his peril .... ",
The court in Katz applied this to property having largely sentimental
value.12 Although conversion typically does not include the failure to
pay money due under a contract,"3 in Unified Services, Inc. v. Home
Insurance Co., 4 the court held that insurance premiums collected by
defendant on behalf of plaintiff, which defendant then failed to forward
to plaintiff, could be the subject matter of a conversion claim.'6

II.
A.

NEGLIGENCE

In General

Every law student knows that different circumstances may call for
different degrees of care. A couple of survey-period cases illustrate that
point well. In Martin v. Gaither,6 the court of appeals reviewed the
history of the "fireman's rule," which provides that an injured fireman
may not recover from the landowner for ordinary negligence directly
related to the origin of the fire. 1 7 The issue in Martin was whether the
fireman's rule also applies to police officers injured in the line of duty."
The court of appeals reviewed the history of the rule in Georgia, and
concluded that it has been
adopted in Georgia, broadly construed to cover tortfeasors other than
those whose acts prompted the presence of the fireman at the place of
injury, narrowly construed to exclude subsequent or extrinsic acts of
negligence other than the initial reason for the fireman's professional

11. Id. at 289-90,457 S.E.2d at 241-42 (quoting Maryland Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welchel, 257
Ga. 259, 261, 356 S.E.2d 877,880 (1987)) (citing ADAMS & ADAMS, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS
§ 2-7 (1996 ed.) [hereinafter GEORGIA TORTS]).

12. Id. at 290, 457 S.E.2d at 242.

13. See Faircloth v. A.L. Williams &Assocs., 206 Ga. App. 764, 426 S.E.2d 601 (1992).
14. 218 Ga. App. 85, 460 S.E.2d 545 (1995).
15. Id. at 89, 460 S.E.2d at 549.
16. 219 Ga. App. 646, 466 S.E.2d 621 (1995).
17. Id. at 647, 466 S.E.2d at 622 (citing Ingram v. Peachtree S., 182 Ga. App. 367, 368,
355 S.E.2d 717, 718 (1987)).

18. Id. at 646, 466 S.E.2d at 622.

496

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

presence, and in dicta, broadly construed to apply to "public safety
employee[s]" including police officers.19
Therefore, the court concluded that the fireman's rule does govern police
officers who are injured in the line of their professional duties.2'
In Clanton v. Gwinnett County School District,2 the court of appeals
held that the contributory negligence of a child aged five years, ten and
one-half months would be a question for the jury.' Georgia has a code
section which provides that "[tihe term 'due care,' when used in reference
to a child of tender years, is such care as the child's mental and physical
capacities enable him to exercise in the actual circumstances of the
occasion and situation under investigation."' Although there was some
question whether the child's parents had properly preserved the issue for
appeal, the court, in a six to three decision, nevertheless held that, while
"[ilt is doubtless that at some early stages of infancy
the issue of
negligence will be a matter of law for the court, " ' absent expert
opinion on child capacities,
the question is properly left to the jury, which can size up all the
particular evidence in the case and bring its collective common
knowledge of children's capacities to bear in determining first, whether
the child was capable of negligence in the premises and second,
whether the child was negligent.'
B.

Premises Liability

The Supreme Court of Georgia used its certiorari authority to visit the
area of premises liability several times during the survey period. In City
of Winder v. Girone,s5 it held that plaintiff, who slipped on sewage that
had overflown from defendant's system into her basement, failed to
exercise ordinary care for her own safety. The court applied "traditional
negligence principles" to hold that a defendant who, in trespassing on
plaintiff's property, creates a hazardous condition, has a duty either to

19. Id. at 650,466 S.E.2d at 624 (quoting Bycom Corp. v. White, 187 Ga. App. 759,762,
371 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1988)).
20. Id. The court cited Cynthia T. Adams, et al., Torts, 41 MERCER L. REV. 355, 357-58
(1989) [hereinafter 1989 Torts], and Charles R. Adams III, et al., Torts, 40 MERCER L. REV.
377, 387-88 (1988) both of which had forecast this result.
21. 219 Ga. App. 343, 464 S.E.2d 918 (1995).

22. Id. at 344, 464 S.E.2d at 918.
23. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-5 (1982); see Ashbaugh v. Trotter, 237 Ga. 46, 226 S.E.2d 736
(1976).
24. 219 Ga. App. at 346, 464 S.E.2d at 920.
25. Id. at 344, 464 S.E.2d at 919.

26. 265 Ga. 723, 462 S.E.2d 704 (1995).
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eliminate the danger or to give warning of its presence.27 Because the
presence of the sewage in this case was open and obvious, the court held
that plaintiff assumed the risk when she attempted to traverse the
flooded area to lead cleaning personnel to the basement.'
In Colquitt v. Rowland," in an even more unlikely factual scenario,
the court held that defendant landowner was not liable to plaintiff, a
party guest of his tenant, for injuries received after she ingested alcohol
and some other mind-altering substances, and subsequently took a nude
dive into defendant's shallow pool. 0 The court, for the first time,
clarified that Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 447-1331 only imposes contractual liability on a landlord. 2 The tort3
liability of a landlord is grounded on O.C.G.A. section 44-7-14. 3
Because the swimming pool in question had been erected by the tenant
after the landlord had parted with possession of the premises, the
negligence was that of the tenant, and "[tlo rule otherwise, i.e., to impose
liability on a landlord for the negligent acts of his tenant, would yield a
harsh and unwanted rule."' 4
Although the general rule is that a defendant premises owner's
knowledge of prior criminal activity on its property is evidence of the

27.

Id. at 723, 462 S.E.2d at 705. In doing so, the court at least indirectly affirmed

Soto v. Roswell Townhomes, Inc., 183 Ga. App. 286, 358 S.E.2d 670 (1987), in which the
court applied to a trespass the complex set of presumptions that the courts have developed
to allocate risk between merchants and their business invitees. These writers have
criticized Soto on the grounds that the policy justifications which it assumes are absent in
cases involving a trespassing defendant. See 1989 Torts, supra note 20, at 390.
28. 265 Ga. at 724, 462 S.E.2d at 705-06.
29. 265 Ga. 905, 463 S.E.2d 491 (1995).
30. All of the lurid facts are found in the court of appeals opinion. See Rowland v.
Colquitt, 214 Ga. App. 544, 545, 448 S.E.2d 457, 459 (1994), reu'd, 265 Ga. 905, 463 S.E.2d
491 (1995). The tenant had installed a swimming pool with a uniform depth of only four
feet, yet nevertheless had a diving board. 214 Ga. App. at 544, 448 S.E.2d at 548.
31. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-13 (1991) provides that "(t]he landlord must keep the premises in
repair. He shall be liable for all substantial improvements placed upon the premises by
his consent."
32. 265 Ga. at 907,463 S.E.2d at 492. But see Denise v. Cannon, 219 Ga. App. 765,466
S.E.2d 885 (1996) (jury question pursuant to § 44-7-13 for landlord's failure to maintain
working smoke detector on premises).
33. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 (1991) provides as follows:
Having fully parted with possession and the right of possession, the landlord is
not responsible to third persons for damages resulting from the negligence or
illegal use of the premises by the tenant; provided, however, the landlord is
responsible for damages arising from defective construction or for damages arising
from failure to keep the premises in repair.
34. 265 Ga. at 906, 463 S.E.2d at 492.
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foreseeability of a substantially similar attack, on a plaintiff, 5 this rule
is not without its limits. For example, if the plaintiff's knowledge of the
dangerous propensities of a third-party assailant is equal to or greater
than that of the defendant premises owner, the plaintiff cannot recover
from a premises owner who also had some knowledge thereof."'
In Sun Trust Banks, Inc. v. Killebrew," the supreme court held that
when the only evidence of prior criminal attacks on defendant's premises
was contained in police reports, defendant did not have a duty to
investigate them to learn of the criminal activity." This, of course,
does not change the rule that actual knowledge of prior violent acts is
evidence of a recognizable risk of harm and can subject a defendant
premises owner to liability, as the court of appeals held in Shoney's, Inc.
v. Hudson."9
In a final supreme court decision of note, Keaton v. A.B.C. Drug Co.,40
defendant who placed bleach at a dangerously high level on store shelves
was chargeable with knowledge of the danger when the cap came off the
bottle and bleach spilled into the customer's eyes.4'
C.

Slip and Fall
Something is fundamentally wrong with the appellate standard of
review for slip and fall cases in Georgia. These authors empirically have
observed for many years that a hugely disproportionate number of these
cases wind up on appeal, and the results are so fact-intensive as to be
almost wholly unpredictable.42 The degree of evidence-weighing that
occurs in these cases sometimes reminds one more of 7velve Angry Men
than of a judicial opinion. It appears that the reality of this problem has
begun to dawn on the court of appeals, beginning with the perceptive
Judge Ruffin, who, in a series of concurrences" and dissents," has
begun to call attention to the growing tension between the inconsistent

35.
36.

See GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 11, § 4-5.
Howell v. Three Rivers Sec., Inc., 216 Ga. App. 890, 456 S.E.2d 278 (1995).

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

266 Ga. 109, 464 S.E.2d 207 (1995).
Id. at 109, 464 S.E.2d at 208.
218 Ga. App. 171, 460 S.E.2d 809 (1995).
266 Ga. 385, 467 S.E.2d 558 (1996).
Id. at 387-88, 467 S.E.2d at 561.

42. See, e.g., Cynthia T. Adams, et al., Torts, 47 MERCER L. REv. 311, 315 (1995)
[hereinafter 1995 Torts]; Cynthia T. Adams, et al., Torts, 46 MERCER L. REV. 465, 473
(1994) [hereinafter 1994 Torts]; Cynthia T. Adams, et al., Torts, 45 MERCER L. REV. 403,
412 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Torts].
43. See Moore v. Kroger Co., 221 Ga. App. 520,,522-23, 471 S.E.2d 916,919-20 (Ruffin,
J., concurring).
44. See Sheriff v. Houston County Hosp. Auth., 221 Ga. App. 14, 16-18, 471 S.E.2d 3,

5-6 (Ruffin, J., dissenting).
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principles the court applies to dispose of4these cases and the provisions
governing summary judgment generally.
A panel of the court took up this concern in Service Merchandise, Inc.
v. Jackson,46 a case that was decided after the close of the current
survey period, 47 but which is included here because of its importance
in following Judge Ruffin's trend. Finding a jury question in that slip
and fall case, the court noted that "[tihe granting of summary judgment
or directed verdict is 'a very, very grave matter,' 48 because "what is at
stake is of constitutional magnitude. 9 Thus, the court has properly
placed the tension in this area as existing between a court's authority to
grant summary judgment or directed verdict on one hand, and the
parties' constitutional right to trial by jury' on the other.
This is obviously an area that needs to be revisited by the Supreme
Court of Georgia. A review of slip and fall decisions, as well as decisions
in other areas of tort law over the past several years, indicates that
certain members of the court of appeals are giving perhaps an overly
expansive reading to the supreme court's decision in Lau's Corp. v.
Haskins,5 by interpreting that case to authorize weighing of evidence
at the appellate level. The responsibility resting on a court in this
situation is not to weigh the evidence, but to "[view] all the facts and
reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party."" Opinions in which the majority decides the
propriety of summary judgment on one set of facts, only to be countered
by a dissent arguing additional facts,58 should give rise to the very
concerns addressed in Jackson. Perhaps, at long last, the tide is
beginning to turn in this very troubled area of law.

45. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 (1993).
46. 221 Ga. App. 897, 473 S.E.2d 209 (1996).
47. This article covers cases published in the Georgia advance sheets between June 1,
1995, and May 31, 1996. Jackson was decided on June 27, 1996.
48. 221 Ga. App. at 898, 473 S.E.2d at 211 (quoting Johnson v. Currenton, 127 Ga.
App. 687, 688, 195 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1972)).
49. Id. at 899, 473 S.E.2d at 211.
50. See GA. CONST. art. I, § I, para. XI (1983).
51. 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991).
52. Id. at 495, 405 S.E.2d at 478 (emphasis added).
53. See, e.g., Piggly Wiggly S., Inc. v. Brown, 219 Ga. App. 614, 468 S.E.2d 387 (1995)
(five-four decision); Department of Human Resources v. Thomas, 217 Ga. App. 174, 456
S.E.2d 724 (1995) (two-three-one-three decision).
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Malpractice

In General. There are three areas of Georgia tort law that are
thoroughly fouled up. The first, slip and fall cases, discussed above,"
is a plague that the judiciary has brought down on its own house. The
second, governmental immunity, discussed below,5" is a Frankenstein's
monster brought to life by a combination of legislative and judicial mad
science.56 The third nightmare, however, is the expert witness affidavit
requirement of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.117 ("section 9.1"), and it can

only be blamed on the legislature. Short of declaring it unconstitutional,5" the courts have used every other device at their disposal to
mitigate the harsh effects of this Georgia legal anomaly. Sisk v.
Patel,59 in which a solid majority of the court of appeals declared this
statute to be "fundamentally broken," 0 was decided during the current
survey period,6 1 but was discussed in last year's torts survey article."
As usual, the following represents only a sampling culled from the
plethora of decisions arising under this section.
In Ewers v. Cooper," the court expressly applied the general rule of
liberal construction of pleadings"4 to a section 9.1 affidavit. The court
declined to apply the rule of Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc.,65
that a party's self-contradictory testimony must be construed against
him, to statements made by that party's expert in a section 9.1
"[Wie allow inconsistencies in pleading, and this rule
affidavit."

54. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 108-22 and accompanying text,
56. For the "mad science" interpretation, see Cynthia T. Adams, et al., "Legal Entropy:
Governmental Immunities and Georgia's State Tort Claims Act," In Fifteenth Annual
InsuranceLaw Institute: ProgramMaterials 1996 (Institute of Continuing Legal Education
Seminar Materials, September 26-28, 1996).
57. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (1993).
58. Although in Lutz v. Foran, 262 Ga. 819, 427 S.E.2d 248 (1993), the supreme court
upheld section 9.1 against a challenge that it violated the provision in the Georgia
constitution against bills containing more than one subject matter (see GA. CONST. art. III,
§ 5, para. 3 (1983)), the supreme court has never addressed the broader constitutional
questions of overbreadth, vagueness, or equal protection. See 1993 Torts, supra note 42,
at 414.
59. 217 Ga. App. 156, 456 S.E.2d 718 (1995).
60. Id. at 160, 456 S.E.2d at 720.
61. See supra note 47.
62. See 1995 Torts, supra note 42, at 318.
63. 217 Ga. App. 434, 457 S.E.2d 705 (1995).
64. See O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-1, 9-11-8 (1993).
65. 256 Ga. 27, 343 S.E.2d 680 (1986).
66. 217 Ga. App. at 434, 457 S.E.2d at 706.
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applies even when an affidavit must be filed to fulfill statutory pleading
requirements."6'7
In Works v.Aupont," a nonprecedential decision,69 the en banc
court ruled that the forty-five day extension granted by subsection
9.1(b)7" is automatic, and the trial court has no authority to inquire
into the merits of plaintiffs allegation that an affidavit could not be
obtained because of time constraints.7 1 There is some magic to the
form of that allegation, however, as plaintiff learned in Keefe v.
Northside Hospital, Inc."2 In that case, the court held that the time
constraint exception of subsection 9.1(b) is exhaustive of the circumstances under which a plaintiff is relieved of the contemporaneous filing
requirement; consequently, a complaint that fails to allege expressly that
is not being filed because of time constraints will be
the affidavit
73
dismissed.

The courts can do only so much to ameliorate the harsh effects of this
statute. As the court of appeals has recognized, "[w]e are not empowered
to amend the lawful acts of the legislature."74 Thus, the court approved
the extension of section 9.1's requirements to suits against athletic
trainers,75 pest control operators,"6 and (maybe) "facial estheti-

67. Id. at 434-35, 457 S.E.2d at 706.
68. 219 Ga. App. 577, 465 S.E.2d 717 (1995).
69.
If the appeal is decided by the whole Court, a full concurrence by a majority of
Judges is a binding precedent, but if the judgment is made only by special
concurrences without a statement of agreement with all that is said in the opinion
or by concurrence in the judgment only, there being general concurrence by less
than a majority of the Judges, it is a physical precedent only.
GA. CT. APP. R. 33(a) (1995).
70. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(b) (1993) provides in part as follows:
The contemporaneous filing requirement of subsection (a) of this Code section
shall not apply to any case in which the period of limitation will expire within ten
days of the date of filing and, because of such time constraints, the plaintiff has
alleged that an affidavit of an expert could not be prepared. In such cases, the
plaintiff shall have 45 days after the filing of the complaint to supplement the
pleadings with the affidavit.
71. 219 Ga. App. at 578, 465 S.E.2d at 718-19.
72. 219 Ga. App. 875, 467 S.E.2d 9 (1996).
73. Id. at 876, 467 S.E.2d at 10.
74. Johnson v. Brueckner, 216 Ga. App. 52, 53, 455 S.E.2d 76, 78 (1994).
75. Georgia Physical Therapy, Inc. v. McCullough, 219 Ga. App. 744, 466 S.E.2d 635
(1995).
76. Fender v. Adams Exterminators, Inc., 218 Ga. App. 62, 460 S.E.2d 528 (1995)
(prospective-only application denied).
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ticians."" In Redmond v. Shook,7" the court declined to validate a
section 9.1 affidavit when the notary had administered the oath over the
telephone. "There must be some solemnity, not mere telephone talk,"
chided the court.7"
Medical Malpractice. In the area of medical malpractice, there
were two interesting decisions. In Gilbert v. R.J. Taylor Memorial
Hospital, Inc.," defendant hospital lost plaintiff's tissue sample and
caused her to undergo unnecessary cancer treatment. The supreme
court held a factual issue existed because of plaintiff's expert witness'
opinion that it was not possible to determine to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that plaintiff had cancer without the tissue sample."1
The other area that continues to be of note is what constitutes an
"action for medical malpractice." 2 Does a patient who falls out of bed
have a malpractice claim or an ordinary negligence claim? The full court
of appeals has answered the question both ways. In Robinson v.Medical
Center," the court said it was malpractice, whereas in an earlier
case," the court considered it ordinary negligence. It appears that the
only way to reconcile these cases is on the basis of whether the act or
omission by the defendant (leaving side rails down, etc.) was based on
that defendant's exercise of medical judgment or was merely an
"administrative act" whose performance requires no professional
knowledge,85 such as carrying out previously received orders."
Legal Malpractice. The area of legal malpractice brought forth one
extremely important survey period decision. In Jones, Day, Reavis &
Pogue v. American Envirecycle, Inc.," the court gave a narrow interpre77. See Brown v. Who's Three, Inc., 217 Ga. App. 131, 132 n.1, 457 S.E.2d 186, 189 n.1
(1995) (physical precedent only, see supra note 69).
78. 218 Ga. App. 477, 462 S.E.2d 172 (1995).

79. Id. at 477, 462 S.E.2d at 173 (quoting Carnes v. Carnes, 138 Ga. 1, 6, 74 S.E. 785,
788 (1912)).

80. 265 Ga. 580, 458 S.E.2d 341 (1995).
81. Id. at 582, 458 S.E.2d at 342.
82. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-70(1) (1982) defines an action for medical malpractice as arising out
of"[h]ealth, medical, dental, or surgical service, diagnosis, prescription, treatment, or care."
Thus, somewhat unsurprisingly, the court held in Crawford v. Spencer, 217 Ga. App. 446,
457 S.E.2d 711 (1995), that a claim for the improper administration of medication and
improper monitoring of the patient's progress with it was one for medical malpractice.
83. 217 Ga. App. 8, 456 S.E.2d 254 (1995).
84. Smith v. North Fulton Med. Ctr., 200 Ga. App. 464, 408 S.E.2d 468 (1991).
85. See Hillhaven Rehabilitation & Convalescent Ctr. v. Patterson, 195 Ga. App. 70,
392 S.E.2d 557 (1990).
86. 217 Ga. App. at 10, 456 S.E.2d at 256.
87. 217 Ga. App. 80, 456 S.E.2d 264 (1995).
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tation to what kind of attorney conduct constitutes a violation of the
standard of care. Defendant law firm's predecessor had prepared a
contract for plaintiff to purchase land from the Emanuel County
Development Authority.88 A court had declared the contract ultra vires
because it did not include a statement of purpose.8 9 The court in Jones,
Day held that defendant's predecessor had not deviated from the
standard of legal care. "As the legal profession is at best an inexact
science, a breach of duty arises only when the relevant.., principles or
procedures are well settled and their application clearly demanded, and
the failure to apply them apparent."90 Following this rule, the court
concluded that, because "[t]he state of the law as to the requirement for
affirmatively including a statement of purpose within the body of a
contract for sale of land by a development authority was not, at the time
the contract document was prepared, well settled, clear, and widely
recognized," defendant would not be liable.9' This language is curiously
reminiscent of that used to confer official immunity under federal law.'
Although its protection for attorneys is quite broad, the number of legal
malpractice cases it will apply to is probably not that large. Most legal
malpractice actions turn on more prosaic matters, such as an attorney's
failure to file papers on time. 93
III.

NEGLIGENCE DEFENSES

Workers' Compensation Bar
A tort claim that arises in the scope of the plaintiff's employment may
be barred by the "exclusive remedy" provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.9 In Brown v. Weller,9" the court of appeals held, in a case
of first impression, that the exclusion does not preclude third-party
claims by the defendant tortfeasor against a co-employee of plaintiff,"
The court reasoned that the third-party defendant had no corresponding
liability to pay over compensation benefits to plaintiff. 7 Also, in

A.

88. Id. at 80, 456 S.E.2d at 265.
89. Id. at 84, 456 S.E.2d at 267.

90. Id. at 83, 456 S.E.2d at 267.
91. Id. at 84, 456 S.E.2d at 267. The court did not offer any authority for this
conclusion.
92. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982); Rogers v. Evans, 792
F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986).
93. E.g., Bill Parker & Assocs. v. Rahr, 216 Ga. App. 838, 456 S.E.2d 221 (1995).
94. See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (1992).
95. 217 Ga. App. 67, 456 S.E.2d 602(1995), reu'd, 266 Ga. 130, 464 S.E.2d 805 (1996).
96. 217 Ga. App. at 68-69, 456 S.E.2d at 603.
97. Id. at 69-70, 456 S.E.2d at 603-04.
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Coleman v. Columns Properties,Inc.,"' the supreme court significantly
clarified the preclusive effect of prior workers' compensation proceedings
on later tort litigation by holding that the issues must be identical before
an estoppel arises."
B.

Statute of Limitations
Plaintiffs offered several ingenuous (or perhaps disingenuous) excuses
in attempts to toll the statute of limitations during the survey period.
Lackey v. Crittenden,'00 while certainly presenting a sympathetic case,
simply did not fall within the legal provisions for tolling which are
extended by the Georgia Code.' 0 ' In that case, plaintiff's counsel had
terminal cancer, was undergoing emergency surgery, and attempted to
mail the lawsuit to the court for filing within the limitations period. As
always seems to be the case with such matters, the complaint was lost
in the mail, and plaintiff tried to argue that counsel's medical disability
amounted to incompetency within the meaning of O.C.G.A. section 9-391,"° which provides for tolling during periods of incapacity. Holding
that the section only applies to parties, and not counsel, the court
declined to extend the statute. 1' 3
There is always considerable controversy about exactly when the twoyear statute of limitations'"' starts running in medical malpractice
cases.'O° Frequently, these cases are filed on the last day or two before
the statute runs, and this issue can become a central focal point in the
case. For example, in Henry v. Medical Center, Inc.,"° the relevant
dates were as follows: September 6, 1991-Patient admitted to
defendant hospital; September 8, 1991-Patient noticed pain and
swelling where IV was inserted; September 10, 1991-Patient went to
her doctor and learned that something was wrong; September 10,

98. 266 Ga. 310, 467 S.E.2d 328 (1996).
99. Id. at 311, 467 S.E.2d at 329.
100. 217 Ga. App. 432, 457 S.E.2d 701 (1995).
101. See O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-90 to 9-3-98 (1982 & Supp. 1996).
102. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-91 (1982).
103. 217 Ga. App. at 433, 457 S.E.2d at 702. In addition, the court elected not to
extend the applicable limitations period pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (1982) under a
theory of "excusable neglect." Id. Likewise, the court in J.T. Indus. Contractors, Inc. v.
Hargis Railcar, Inc., 217 Ga. App. 679, 458 S.E.2d 702 (1995), reiterated that a bankruptcy
proceeding filed under Title 11 of the United States Code does not actually toll the running
of a statute of limitations, but merely extends any time that would have otherwise run by
30 days following the termination of the automatic stay.
104. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71 (Supp. 1996).
105. See, e.g., 1994 Torts, supra note 42, at 493-94.
106. 216 Ga. App. 893, 456 S.E.2d 216 (1995).
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1993-Patient filed suit.0 7 The court held that the patient's claim was
barred by the statute, which started running when the injury occurred
and physically manifested itself, not when the patient discovered the
medical cause of her injuries.'0 8
In Crawford v. Spencer,"°9 the court of appeals rejected a continuing
tort theory for purposes of statute of limitations tolling in medical
malpractice cases. Although plaintiff did not know what was causing his
pain, he knew something was wrong, and although plaintiff subjectively
thought his problem was caused by something else, the court reemphasized that the statute was running against him all the time."0
During 1995 the Georgia Legislature amended the workers' compensation third-party tort statute of limitations to allow plaintiffs a longer
time to bring claims against third-party tortfeasors."' The amendment expressly applied to all injuries that occurred on or after July 1,
1992."' After reiterating that one does not have a vested right in the
continued existence of a statute of limitations,"' the supreme court in
Vaughn v. Vulcan Materials"4 gave retroactive application to that
amendment.
C.

Immunity
Under the present application of sovereign immunity as it exists in
Georgia, a plaintiff who is injured by a county has no negligence cause5
of action unless the injury arose from the use of an automobile,"
whereas a plaintiff negligently injured by the State may proceed under
the Georgia Tort Claims Act.1 6 Acknowledging that this disparity
exists, the supreme court in Woodard v. Laurens County"7 nevertheless found that the scheme passed constitutional muster since the waiver
of sovereign immunity is a privilege, not a right." 8 The court added

107. Id. at 893, 456 S.E.2d at 217-18.
108. Id. at 894, 456 S.E.2d at 218.
109. 217 Ga. App. 446, 457 S.E.2d 711 (1995).

110. Id. at 448, 457 S.E.2d at 713.
111.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1 (Supp. 1996). See also 1995 Torts, supra note 42, at 331.

112. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(e) (Supp. 1996).
113. See Canton Textile Mills v. Lathem, 253 Ga. 102, 317 S.E.2d 189 (1984).

114. 266 Ga. 163, 465 S.E.2d 661 (1996).
115. See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).
116. See O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-20 et. seq. (1994).

117. 265 Ga. 404, 456 S.E.2d 581 (1995).
118. See Sikes v. Candler County, 247 Ga. 115, 274 S.E.2d 464 (1981).

506

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

that "[a]ny remedy for this unequal treatment lies with the General
Assembly rather than the courts."" 9
County government employees are entitled to official immunity for
actions taken in the scope of their employment"0 unless they act "with
actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury in the performance of
their official duties."' 2' In a case of first impression, the supreme court
in Merrow v. Hawkins122 was called upon to define "actual malice."
The high court opined that because the constitution used the term actual
malice as opposed to implied malice, the phrase was not meant to
include reckless disregard
for conduct, but assumed only a "deliberate
" 123
intention to do wrong.

Another case of statutory interpretation, Department of Human
Resources v. Hutchinson,"4 involved plaintiff being shot by a foster
child who had been placed in her home by the Department of Human
Resources. Claims brought against the State must be brought pursuant
to the Tort Claims Act, 12 which specifically excludes losses from
assault and battery.12 Plaintiff argued that the exclusion applied only
when the assault or battery was committed by a state officer or
employee. The court, however, rejected this argument and held that the
exclusion included all losses that resulted from intentional acts
regardless of who committed the act. 127 Also during this survey period,
the court of appeals in Garrett v. Georgia Higher EducationAssistance
Corp.12 stated that claims brought against the Georgia Higher
Education Assistance Corporation were not subject to the Tort Claims
Act.129

119.

265 Ga. at 406,456 8.E.2d at 583. For a discussion of the differing interpretations

concerning how sovereign immunity is extended to counties and municipalities, see
Bitterman v. Atkins, 217 Ga. App. 652, 458 S.E.2d 688 (1995).
120. See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).
121. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(d) (1983) (amended 1991).
122. 266 Ga. 390, 467 S.E.2d 336 (1996).

123. Id. at 391, 467 S.E.2d at 337.
124. 217 Ga. App. 70, 456 S.E.2d 642 (1995).

125. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-20 to 50-21-37 (1994).
126. Id. § 50-21-24(7).
127. 217 Ga. App. at 72, 456 S.E.2d at 845.
128. 217 Ga. App. 415, 457 S.E.2d 677 (1995).
129. Id. at 415, 457 8.E.2d at 678. "[A] corporation cannot be a 'state officer or

employee,' and [the Georgia Higher Education Assistance Corporation] is not one of the
state government entities" specifically mentioned in the Act to which it applies. Id.
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OTHER TORT CAUSES OF ACTION

ProductsLiability
Although this survey period did not produce any products liability
decisions of the magnitude of Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc.," there
were, nevertheless, several important matters before the courts. One
issue left unresolved by Banks was whether the risk-utility analysis it
adopted for design defect cases supersedes the outmoded "open and
obvious" rule, which exonerates a manufacturer from liability if the
dangerous or defective condition of the product should have been
apparent to a reasonable user."' In Wilson Foods Corp. v. Turner,"2
the court of appeals applied Banks in the context of a failure-to-warn
case. Plaintiff's young son was severely burned when a can of hot
shortening manufactured by defendant dissolved in plaintiff's hands as
he was carrying it to the trash. He based his claim in part on defendant's failure to put on the container's lid a warning not to pour hot oil
into it.'33 Because plaintiff admitted he failed to read the warning
that was supplied, the court reversed a jury verdict in his favor on the
grounds that some evidence had gone to the jury about the content of the
warning. 134 The court went on to hold, however, that, upon retrial,
plaintiff could introduce evidence pertaining to the adequacy of
defendant's efforts to communicate the warning, including warnings
issued by other manufacturers, provided that plaintiff could lay a proper
evidentiary foundation. 3 5 This would relate, said the court, to the
Banks factor of whether a safer alternative design was "a marketable
reality and technologically feasible." 3 ' Thus, the Georgia open and
obvious rule may not yet be dead, but it is clearly on life support.
Claims based on breach of warranty are an area of products liability
litigation that have been somewhat eclipsed in recent years by the rise
A.

130. 264 Ga. 732,450 S.E.2d 671 (1994), discussedin 1995 Torts, supra note 42, at 33637 ("Banks ... is surely to be reckoned as the most significant Georgia products liability

decision in a generation."). During this survey period, the supreme court ruled that the
risk-utility analysis adopted in Banks could be applied to support an award of punitive
damages. Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 266 Ga. 607, 611, 469 S.E.2d 171, 175 (1996).
131. See GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 11, § 25-8.

132. 218 Ga. App. 74, 460 S.E.2d 532 (1995).
133. Id. at 74, 460 S.E.2d at 533, Plaintiff also claimed that defendant negligently
designed the container of a composite material resembling metal. Id.

134. Id. at 75-76, 460 S.E.2d at 534-35.
135. Id. at 77-78, 460 S.E.2d at 535-36.
136. Id. at 78, 460 S.E.2d at 536 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Banks, 264 Ga. at 736,
450 S.E.2d at 675).
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of the strict liability theory of recovery"3 7 Nevertheless, the breach of

warranty theory was of vital significance in several survey period cases.
The most common type of warranty claim in products cases is founded
on the implied warranty of merchantability.'" It is somewhat limited
in scope by the requirements of notice of breach 13 9 and privity,"
although privity attaches the moment the customer takes possession of
the product with the intention of purchasing it.'" Here, too, Georgia

courts continue to apply a version of the "open and obvious" rule, holding
that the implied warranty of merchantability does not extend to patent
defects. 142 In Moore v. Berry," however, the court deemed the defect-a veneered area of filler on a wooden tree stand-to be latent and,
hence, within the implied warranty.'" Furthermore, held the court,
defendant's representations to plaintiff that the tree stand was "probably

the safest one on the market" and that there was "no way [plaintiff]
could fall in this stand" were sufficient to create an express warranty as
well. 145
Yet another type of warranty in products cases is the implied

warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 46 However, this warranty does not operate unless the seller at the time of sale has reason to
know of the particular purpose. 14 1

In Jones v. Marcus,'" the court

held that plaintiff's telling defendant that he wanted tires for his pickup
truck was not sufficient to invoke this warranty, absent evidence that
defendant knew what the truck was to be used for. 49

137. See generally GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 11, § 25-5.
138. See O.C.G.A. § 11-2-314 (1994).
139. In Buford v. Toys R' Us, Inc., 217 Ga. App. 565, 458 S.E.2d 373 (1995), the court
held that no notice to defendant of breach of warranty prior to filing the lawsuit two years
after the accident was insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the requirements of
O.C.G.A. § 11-2-607(3)(a).
140. The intricacies of the privity rule in Georgia are discussed in GEORGIA TORTS,
supra note 11, § 25-5.
141. See Keaton v. A.B.C. Drug Co., 266 Ga. 385, 467 S.E.2d 558 (1996).
142. See, e.g., Smith v. Northeast Ga. Fair Ass'n, 85 Ga. App. 32,36,67 S.E.2d 836,839
(1951).
143. 217 Ga. App. 697, 458 S.E.2d 879 (1995).
144. Id. at 697, 458 S.E.2d at 880.
145. Id. at 698-99, 458 S.E.2d at 880-81; see O.C.G.A. § 11-2-313 (1994).
146. See O.C.G.A. § 11-2-315 (1994).
147. Id. The statute also requires that the seller have knowledge of the buyer's
reliance on his skill and judgment in furnishing the goods, and these requirements are
conjunctive. See Bruce v. Calhoun First Nat'l Bank, 134 Ga. App. 790, 216 S.E.2d 622
(1975).
148. 217 Ga. App. 372, 457 S.E.2d 271 (1995).
149. Id. at 374, 457 S.E.2d at 272-73.
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B. Defamation
In Lawton v. Georgia Television Co.,"5 the court re-applied the
"neutral reportage" rule to hold that a report about a national guard
investigation of sexual harassment which plaintiff alleged was defamatoThe
ry of him was privileged pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 51-5-7.'
test is whether defendant had engaged in "defamatory editing," so that
the resultant report carried a greater "sting" than the original material
from which it was drawn."5 2 The court in this case, applying the
analysis found in the Restatement,' held it did not. Nor, held the
court, was defendant required to devote equal time to plaintiff's
contentions about the report that condemned him. 54
In another case involving privilege, the court in Garrett v. Georgia
Higher Education Assistance Corp.155 ("GHEAC") applied the absolute156 privilege of O.C.G.A. section 51-5-817 regarding allegations
in pleadings. Plaintiff GHEAC sued defendant in a state court to collect
a student loan. Defendant, acting pro se, counterclaimed for $5,700,000,
arguing that because the complaint involved a federally funded student
loan governed by federal law, the Georgia court was not "a court of
competent jurisdiction" for purposes of the privilege. 158 Noting that
defendant "recognize[d] ... that plaintiff's rights as a holder of the note
are subject to the Georgia Commercial Code,"'59 the court held defendant had failed to show exclusive federal jurisdiction, and, consequently,

150. 216 Ga. App. 768, 456 S.E.2d 274 (1995).
151. Id. at 771, 456 S.E.2d at 277. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7 (1982 & Supp. 1996) provides a
conditional privilege for, inter alia, "[flair and honest reports of the proceedings of...
judicial bodies," and "[c]omments upon the acts of public men or public women in their
public capacity and with reference thereto." Id. § 51-5-7(5), (9). This typically encompasses
quasi-judicial administrative hearings such as the one at issue in Lawton.
152. 216 Ga. App. at 770-71, 456 S.E.2d at 276-77.
153. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611, cmt.f (1977) (report must only be
"substantially accurate" and "fair").
154. 216 Ga. App. at 772, 456 S.E.2d at 278. The court did recognize that "in certain
situations the sensationalist 'news' reporting of which [plaintiff] complains may be
actionable." Id.
155. 217 Ga. App. 415, 457 S.E.2d 677 (1995).
156. The difference between an "absolute" and a "conditional" privilege is that the latter
is waived by evidence of malice. See GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 11, § 28-5.
157. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-8 (1982) privileges "[aill charges, allegations, and averments
contained in regular pleadings filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, which are
pertinent to the relief sought, whether legally sufficient to obtain it or not .... [h]owever
false and malicious such charges, allegations, and averments may be."
158. 217 Ga. App. at 415-16, 457 S.E.2d at 678-79.
159. Id. at 416, 457 S.E.2d at 679.
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the state court was "presumptively competent" to adjudicate the
claim." °
An essential element of any defamation claim is damages. Depending
on the type of defamatory utterance involved, a plaintiff may have to
show "special damages" in order to recover.16 1 Such a case was
Webster v.Wilkins, 2 in which plaintiff sued the professional basketball player Dominique Wilkins, the father of her child, for saying of
plaintiff in a newspaper interview that "[sihe's unfit to have a kid."1
The court held that because Wilkins' statement did not fit into one of the
categories of slander per se,"' plaintiff could not recover because she
had not proved any special damages." "The loss of income, of profits,
or even of gratuitous entertainment and hospitality will be special
damage if the plaintiff can show that it was caused by the defendant's
words.""
Plaintiff had proved none of those, so the trial court
properly granted summary judgment against her.
C.

Malicious Prosecution
The court reiterated the general public policy against malicious
prosecution actions in McGonagil v. Treadwell.167 This case might well
have been styled Hatfield v.McCoy, because the facts involved a lengthy
feud between neighboring suburbanites arising out of the playing of a set
of electric guitars and drums. Defendant had plaintiff arrested for
criminal trespass when plaintiff came over one night to complain about

160. Id.
161. See generally GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 11, § 28-9.
162, 217 Ga. App. 194, 456 S.E.2d 699 (1995).
163, Id. at 194, 456 S.E.2d at 700.
164. According to O.C.G.A. § 51-5-4 (1982), the following categories of slander do not
require a showing of special damage: (1) imputation of crime; (2) charges that the plaintiff
has some "contagious disorder," or is "guilty of some debasing act7; and (3) charges against
the plaintiffs "trade, office, or profession."
165. 217 Ga. App. at 195-96, 456 S.E.2d at 701. The court also held that Wilkins'
statement was merely an expression of opinion, and not actionable on that ground, either.
Id.
166. Id. at 196, 456 S.E.2d at 701 (quoting Jamison v. First Ga. Bank, 193 Ga. App.
219, 222-23, 387 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1989)).
167. 216 Ga. App. 850, 456 S.E.2d 260 (1995).
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the drums, and despite its distaste for this type of case,'6 the court
found that a jury question existed here.169
D. Wrongful Death
In the area of wrongful death, one question that the courts had really
never definitively decided was to what extent a recovery by a plaintiff
for personal injuries precludes a subsequent wrongful death action by
the plaintiff's statutory survivors arising out of the same injuries. In
Winding River Village Condominium Ass'n v. Barnett,7 ° the court of
appeals held that the two actions are separate and the earlier recovery
would not preclude a later wrongful death action. 7' The Supreme
Court of Georgia followed with its opinion in Waldroup v. Green County
Hospital Authority,'7 2 which held the same and further held that
collateral estoppel did not apply in those circumstances. 7 '
The Georgia Supreme Court addressed another important wrongful
death question in Peters v. HospitalAuthority. 74 Answering a certified
question from the Eleventh Circuit, the court held that, although the
parents have a right to recover for the full value of the child's life,' 75
there is no separate wrongful death cause of action on behalf of the
stillborn child itself. 17Said
the court, "we are reluctant to accord legal
6
rights to the unborn."

E.

Fraud
The Fair Business Practices Act of 1975177 received a good bit of

attention from the appellate courts during the period surveyed.
Answering a certified question from the Eleventh Circuit, the supreme

168. These actions, said the court, are
strictly guarded ...

[and are] never encouraged, except in plain cases; were it

otherwise, ill consequences would ensure to the public, for no one would willingly
undertake to vindicate a breach of the public law and to discharge his duty to
society, with the prospect of an annoying suit staring him in the face.
Id. at 853, 456 S.E.2d at 263 (quoting Ventress v. Rosser, 73 Ga. 534, 541 (1884)).
169. Id. at 854, 456 S.E.2d at 264.
170. 218 Ga. App. 35, 459 S.E.2d 569 (1995).
171. Id. at 36-37, 459 S.E.2d at 571.
172. 265 Ga. 864, 463 S.E.2d 5 (1995).
173. Id. at 866-68, 463 S.E.2d at 7-8.
174, 265 Ga. 487, 458 S.E.2d 628 (1995).
175. Id. at 488, 458 S.E.2d at 629 (citing Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d
100 (1955)).
176. Id., 458 S.E.2d at 630.
177. O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-390 to 10-1-407 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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court held in Friedlander v.PDK Labs, Inc.178 that nonconsumers
cannot sue competitors under the Act for misrepresentations to the
public.179 Although the Act does require an element of justifiable
reliance similar to common-law fraud claims, 80 the court found in
Baranco, Inc. v.Bradshaw""'that there was no justifiable reliance by
plaintiff concerning the financing terms of her new vehicle. When
plaintiff took possession of the vehicle, she knew that the check she had
given had been cashed and that she would be unable to obtain a lease
on the vehicle."8 2
In common-law fraud claims, the court in Armstrong Transfer &
Storage Co. v. Mann Construction" declined to extend the passive
concealment doctrine, first enunciated in Wilhite v. Mays,184 to sales
of commercial property. The passive concealment doctrine provides an
exception to the general rule of caveat emptor for the sale of residential
real estate. It imposes a duty upon a seller to disclose facts not
apparent to the buyer of which the seller has special knowledge and
which the seller is aware that the buyer would deem important to his
purchase decision.'8 5
Fraud actions typically cannot be based upon mere sales talk or
"puffery."8 6 In King v.Codisco, Inc.,"' however, the court held that
defendant's statement that it would "give [plaintiff] the lowest price that
[defendant) gave to any of its customers" was not puffery but was a
statement of fact upon which plaintiff was entitled to rely.'8 8
F

Business Torts
Georgia has a tort action for misappropriation of trade secrets and
ideas.'89 In Leo Publications, Inc. v. Reid,"9 the supreme court held
that plaintiff's advertising customer list was not a trade secret because

178. 266 Ga. 180, 465 S.E.2d 670 (1996).
179. Id. at 180, 465 S.E.2d at 671. According to the court, the Act's intent was to
provide relief to consumers, not business competitors. Id.
180. See Allen v. ReMax N. Atlanta, Inc., 213 Ga. App. 644, 445 S.E.2d 744 (1994);
Zeeman v. Black, 156 Ga. App. 82, 273 S.E.2d 910 (1980).

181. 217 Ga. App. 169, 456 S.E.2d 592 (1995).
182. Id. at 172, 456 S.E.2d at 594.
183. 217 Ga. App. 538, 458 S.E.2d 481 (1995).
184. 239 Ga. 31, 235 S.E.2d 532 (1977).
185. See generally GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 11, § 32-3.

186. See Terhune v. Coker & Co., 107 Ga. 352, 33 S.E. 394 (1899); McCrimmon v.
Tandy Corp., 202 Ga. App. 233, 414 S.E.2d 15 (1991).

187. 217 Ga. App. 704, 458 S.E.2d 881 (1995).
188. Id. at 705, 458 S.E.2d at 882.
189. See generally Adams & Adams, GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 11, § 33-4.
190. 265 Ga. 561, 458 S.E.2d 651 (1995).
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"it was readily ascertainable by proper means." 9 ' This, of course, is
an exception to the general rule that customer lists are the employer's
property and are protected trade secrets." Further, the court held
that plaintiff's future business plans were not trade secrets within the
contemplation of Georgia law because they were not "novel or original. 193
Although plaintiffs seek to redress many types of business wrongs
under the general headings of the torts of interference with business or
contractual relations,' some things simply do not give rise to these
torts. For example, in Phillips v. MacDougald,95 the court of appeals
held, in a case of first impression, that an action for tortious interference
will not lie based on the defendant's filing of a lawsuit which allegedly
interferes with the plaintiff's business relations. The court balanced the
competing public policies of citizens' legitimate interest in economic
advantage and freedom from undue interference in business against the
constitutional right of access to the courts,' 96 and concluded that "[tihis
state appears to have a compelling governmental interest in encouraging
citizens to settle disputes through the court, rather than through selfhelp which can foster prolonged acrimony and even violence among
otherwise peaceable citizens." 97
V. DAMAGES

A.

In General
Rampell v. Williams"8 dealt with the right of a plaintiff to recover
for the increased costs of future insurance resulting from a personal
injury. In that case, the court held that plaintiff could not recover such
increased costs in the absence of direct evidence that the defendant's
negligence caused that particular economic injury. Further, the court
held that to allow plaintiff to recover for future medical expenses, and
also for increased insurance premiums related to those same injuries,
would be an impermissible double recovery.'9

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 562, 458 S.E.2d at 652.
See Avnet, Inc. v. Wyle Labs., 263 Ga. 615, 437 S.E.2d 302 (1993).
265 Ga. at 562, 458 S.E.2d at 652.
See generally GEORGIA TORTS, supra note 11, §§ 33-2, 33-3.
219 Ga. App. 152, 464 S.E.2d 390 (1995).
Id. at 156, 464 S.E.2d at 395; see GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 12 (1983).
219 Ga. App. at 157, 464 S.E.2d at 395-96.
217 Ga. App. 292, 457 S.E.2d 224 (1995).
Id. at 294, 457 S.E.2d at 226.
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An admittedly negligent lawyer got off "scot-free" because of a
questionable damages ruling by the court of appeals in Crowley v. Trust
Co. Bank. ° Plaintiff, a bank, required both a first mortgage on real
estate and an individual guaranty to secure a loan. Defendant attorney
negligently certified title to the real estate, with the result being that
the bank did not have a proper lien on it. The bank chose to go after the
attorney for legal malpractice, rather than the guarantor, arguing both
that it had a right to elect its remedy and that the existence of the
guaranty was a collateral source to the legal malpractice claim. The
court of appeals turned down both claims, reversing the trial court. It
held that the bank was not damaged within the meaning of the law
because it had a remedy against the guarantor in lieu of the real
estate. 20 ' A two-judge concurrence, however, apparently left the door
type of negligent
open for the guarantor to sue the attorney on some
22
misrepresentation or third-party beneficiary claim.

Most animal lovers would disagree with the Georgia Court of Appeals
position concerning the emotional value of pets. In Carroll v. Rock,2 o6
plaintiff left her two cats at the veterinarian for neutering. While at the
vet's office, Tigger, a rather vicious feline, managed to fight his way out
of the office to freedom, never to return. Plaintiff sued the vet alleging
conversion and emotional distress.2 The court of appeals reversed
the sympathetic jury's award for mental anguish, pain, and suffering
because plaintiff's angst was unaccompanied by physical or pecuniary
loss, and there was205no evidence that defendant acted maliciously,
wilfully, or wantonly.
It should also be noted, as shown in two survey period cases, that
concerns about possible future losses will not support a damages award.
In Smith v. Geiger, 206 plaintiffs' speculation that tax liens against
defendants might place plaintiffs' leased property in jeopardy lacked

200. 219 Ga. App. 531, 466 S.E.2d 24 (1995).
201. Id. at 533, 466 S.E.2d at 26.
202. Id. at 533-34, 466 S.E.2d at 26 (Blackburn, J., concurring specially).
203. 220 Ga. App. 260, 469 S.E.2d 391 (1996).
204. Id. at 260, 469 S.E.2d at 392-93.
205. Id. at 263, 469 S.E.2d at 393. See also Ryckeley v. Callaway, 261 Ga. 828, 412
S.E.2d 826 (1992); Westview Cemetery v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1975).
Concerning plaintiff's allegations of malicious actions, the court stated:
We do not agree with [plaintiffs] argument that [defendant's] acts of waiting
four hours before telling [plaintiff] of the loss, misrepresenting to her how the cat
escaped and the efforts undertaken to find it and the nonchalant manner in which
she was informed of the loss constituted a willful disregard of her rights or
extremely outrageous conduct.
220 Ga. App. at 261, 469 S.E.2d at 393.
206. 217 Ga. App. 165, 456 S.E.2d 636 (1995).
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sufficient certainty upon which a damages claim could be based.
Likewise, plaintiff's fear of being fired in Department of Human
Resources v. Thomas 7 was not competent evidence in support of a
claim for loss of future earnings.
B.

CollateralSource
In an interesting decision, Warren v. Ballard,'8 the Georgia Supreme Court held that collateral source evidence is not admissible for
impeachment in a case in which the plaintiff testifies to anxiety about
payment of medical bills. The court's rationale was that impeachment
by collateral source evidence is only allowed if the false testimony is
related to a "material issue" in the case. Because there is no authority
that permits a recovery for anxiety, agony, or worry over the payment
of medical bills, testimony concerning it does not relate to such a
material issue, and, therefore, there can be no impeachment of that
testimony. Defendant's remedy in such a case, said the court, is to object
to the false testimony and request curative instructions from the trial
court. "In appropriate cases, other sanctions are available, such as
rebuke of counsel, contempt of court, or even a mistrial with appropriate
costs cast upon the plaintiff."20 9 In an interesting dissent, Justices
Sears and Fletcher argued that both the testimony about the anxiety
over the medical bills and the collateral source information should be
admissible and relevant.21 °
C. Punitive Damages
Many big corporations think they are doing themselves a favor when
they reduce everything to writing. Sometimes, however, this may not be
the case. In Restaura, Inc. v. Singleton,1 the court of appeals held
that defendant's violation of its own internal policies constituted
evidence of conscious indifference to consequences for purposes of a
punitive damage claim. Defendant's employees were admittedly aware
of the consequences of their omissions, and, therefore, this was a proper
case for punitive damages to be considered.212

207. 217 Ga. App. 174, 456 S.E.2d 724 (1995).
208. 266 Ga. 408, 467 S.E.2d 891 (1996).
209. Id. at 410, 467 S.E.2d at 894.
210. Id. at 410-13, 467 S.E.2d at 894-96 (Sears, J., dissenting in part and specially
concurring in part).
211. 215 Ga. App. 887, 456 S.E.2d 219 (1995).
212. Id. at 888, 456 S.E.2d at 221.
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CONCLUSION

One of the most legendary aspects of the 7itanic saga was the heroism
of many crew members who toiled on at their posts of duty until the very
last; some, like Captain E.J. Smith, choosing to go down with the
ship.2 13 We know from experience that editors of law reviews sometimes feel that they are in the same boat,2 1 but we believe the great
poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow probably came closer to describing
the editors of the Georgia Survey in the following lines:
The heights by great men reached and kept
Were not attained by sudden flight,
But they, while their companions slept,
Were toiling upward in the night.21

213. See, e.g., WADE, supra note 1, at 90-91.
214. See, e.g., 1994 Torts, supra note 42, at 516 ("So workers of the Law School
worldWhile some strength still remainsjArise, unite, demand a beerIAnd slug 'em with
your chains.") (quoting Karl Llewellyn, "Song of the Law Review" (1952)).
215. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, "The Ladder of St. Augustine," stanza 10 (1858).

